Madin v. Industrial Acci. Com. by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
2-3-1956
Madin v. Industrial Acci. Com.
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Madin v. Industrial Acci. Com." (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 129.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/129
no :i'v!ADIN INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. 
in California. As to the subsequently commenced action in 
California it was held that the trial court abused its dis-
a motion of the Texas plaintiff (a Cali-
fornia to stay proceedings in the California action 
which the plaintiff was the Texas defendant) until final 
determination of the Texas action. Conceivably both the 
'rexas court and the California court could have jurisdiction 
to proceed and to determine the identical issues. The mo-
tion for a stay of proceedings, therefore, called for an exer-
cise of judicial discretion which would not affect the juris-
diction, as such, of either court. Here, the final determi-
nation by either tribunal that it has jurisdiction to award 
relief in the case before it will be conclusive that the other 
lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the matter before it. The 
Simmons case, therefore, is not in point on the issue before 
us, and no implications inconsistent with the views we have 
announced should be attributed to its holding. We conclude, 
in accord with the cases cited (supm, p. 81), that prohibition 
is the proper remedy here. 
For the reasons above stated, let the writ of prohibition 
issue as prayed. 
[L. A. No. 23872. In Bank. Feb. 3, 1956.] 
MARCO J. MADIN et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT COMMISSION, JAMES R. RICHARD-
SON et al., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Relation to 
Employment.-Though an injury to be compensable must arise 
out of employment, the injury need not be of a kind antici-
pated by the employer nor peculiar to the employment in the 
sense that it would not have occurred elsewhere. 
[2] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-Causal 
connection between the employment and the injury need not 
be the sole cause; it is sufficient if it is a contributory cause. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 61; Am.Jur., Work-
men's Compensation, § 209 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5, 7] Workmen's Compensation, § 72; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation,§ 74; [3] Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 93; [4] Workmen's Compensation, § 71; [61 Workmen's Com-
pensation, § 91; [8] Workmen's Compensation, § 224. 
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out 
Compensable Injuries 
doubts as to whether an are be re-
solved in favor of the 
!d.-Compensable Injuries- Relation to Employment.-In-
in the course of may arise out 
of the employment and hence be compensable although the 
which put in motion the force the injury was 
over which the employer had no control and with 
which he no connection. 
!d.-Compensable Injuries-Perils Peculiar to Employment.-
·whcre claimants, who lived in one of employer's rental units 
under an agreement to act as caretakers and managers of the 
property and collect the rent, were injured when a bulldozer, 
which was being used on property in the neighborhood, ran 
wild after being started without authority by some boys and 
rammed into the unit occupied by claimants, pushing them 
while in their beds through the walls of the unit, an award 
of compensation may be supported by taking the narrow view 
that a portion of the employer's premises injured claimants, 
nnd also on the broader view that the employer's premises be-
came unsafe because of the uncontrolled bulldozer. 
Id.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-Where 
an injury occurs on the employer's premises while the em-
is in the course of employment, the injury arises out of 
the t>mployment unless the connection is so remote from the 
employment that it is not an incident of it. 
Id.- Compensation Recoverable- Computation of Average 
Earnings.-Lab. Code, § 4453, which in effect says that the 
earning capacity of any person covered by the workmen's 
compensation laws shall not be computed at less than $15 per 
week, is not arbitrary or unreasonable. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial 
Accident Commission awarding compensation for personal 
A wards affirmed. 
Higgs, Fletcher & Mack for Petitioners. 
Everett A. Cm·ten, Daniel C. Murphy and Edward A. 
Sarkisian for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Petitioners Madin and his insurance carrier 
seek the annulment of an award of workmen's compensation 
to ,James Richardson and Lethia Richardson, his wife. 
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hereinafter Madin owned certain 
14 rental units and the Richardsons were 
in of these rental units. Madin employed the 
Richardsons to act as caretakers and managers of the prop-
and collect the rent. were on duty 24 hours a 
and were available to meet any problems that arose 
those hours. For this they received 10 per cent of 
the rentals and a discount on the rent of the unit occupied 
them; Richardson was also to receive $1.50 per hour for 
any day labor performed by him. 
About 2 o'clock in the morning on July 7, 1952, while the 
Richardsons were in bed, a bulldozer, which was being used 
on in the neighborhood, ran wild after being started 
without authority by some boys and rammed into the unit 
occupied by the Richardsons, pushing them while in their 
beds through the walls of the unit and causing the injuries 
for which compensation was awarded. The facts in regard 
to the action of the bulldozer are fully set forth in Richard-
son v. Ham, 44 Cal.2d 772 [285 P.2d 269], which involved 
an action by Richardson and others for the alleged negligence 
of Ham Brothers, the owners of the bulldozer, in permitting 
the bulldozer to remain on the property where it was being 
used without safeguards against its being started. Madin 
had no control over the bulldozer or interest in the work 
being done by it; nor did he have any connection with the 
boys who started it on its destructive course. 
Petitioners concede that the injuries occurred in the course 
of employment but say they did not arise out of the employ-
ment, and contend that section 4453 of the Labor Code, infra, 
and its interpretation and application to Mrs. Richardson 
are unconstitutionaL 
[1] Certain principles recently stated by this court are 
applicable to the facts of this case: ''Though an injury to 
be compensable must arise out of the employment, that is, 
occur by reason of a condition or incident of employment, 
the injury need not be of a kind anticipated by the employer 
nor peculiar to the employment in the sense that it would not 
have occurred elsewhere. (Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., 26 Cal.2d 286 [158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313]; 
Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Inclustrial Ace. Com., 19 Cal.2d 622 
[122 P.2d 570, 141 A.L.R. 798] .) [2] If we look for a 
causal connection between the employment and the injury, 
such connection need not be the sole cause; it is sufficient 
if it is a contributory cause. (Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
MADI2i ·v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. 93 
[46 C.2d 
Where a per-
to be on the streets in the eourse of his em-
falls to the street, the 
reasonable doubts 
LH ""'"'V>~ are to be resolved in favor of the 
Industrial Ace. 27 Ca1.2d 
Mut. Cas. Co. . lrulustrial Ace. 
P.2d ; Industrial Indcm. Bxch. 
Industrial Ace. Corn., 26 Cal.2d ]30 [156 P.2d 9261.)' 
Mni. Liab. lnr;. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 41 
676, 679 [263 P.2d 4] .) 
Consonant with those principles it has been held h1 
nnjous situations that injuries occurring in trw course of 
also arise out of the employment and hence were 
compensable although the factor •d1ich put in motion the 
force causing the injury was something over which the 
had no control and \Yith which he had no con-
JJPction. In Khnbol v. Indnstn:az Ace. Com., 173 CaL 351 
150, Ann.Cas. 1917E 312, hR.A. 1917B 595], the 
was injured when tlw eriling of the room in wl1ich 
he was working fell because of an oyerloading- of thr floor 
above: the employer had no control owr the upper floor, th0 
being done by a third person w·ith whom he had 
no eonnection. Pacific Inclem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
RG Cal.App.2d 726 [195 P.2d 919], involved an injury from 
a w·indow on the employer's premisPs \Vhich fell be-
cause of an explosion on nearby premises with which the 
had nothing to do. 'l'he injury occurred in Enter-
Dairy Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 202 Cal. 247 [259 
, when an earthquake caused a wall on premises 
those of the employer to faJl through the roof of 
the employer's premises and broke milk bottles which the 
was handling in the course of his employment. In 
Industn'al Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 95 Cal.App.2d 
804 [214 P.2d 41], the employl'e, a bart0nder, \Tas killed 
by shot fired by a cm;tomer's wife at the customer cl11ring 
an altercation between them in the bar In Paulsen v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 6 Ca1.App.2d 570 I 4fi P.2d , the employe", 
a lost his eye from the explosion of a dynamitf: 
cap in his campfire, the cap apparently having been left 
where he built his fire, by a road crew with which his em-
had no connection. 
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There are cases apparently to the contrary (see Associated 
Indem. Corp. Industrial Ace. Corn., 43 Cal.App.2d 292 
[110 P.2d 676], criticized in Industrial Indem. Co. v. Indtts-
trial Ace. S1tpm, 95 Cal.App.2d 804; Stm·rn v. Indtts-
trial Ace. 191 Cal. 4 [214 P. 874] ), but they fail to 
give the liberal construction required of workmen's compen-
sation laws and are not in accord with the authorities above 
cited. The statement in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. 39 Cal.2d 512 [247 P.2d 697], that there must 
be some connection bet>veen the injury and employment, other 
than that the employment brought the injured party to the 
place of is not of importance here because the court 
was there speaking of course of employment and held that 
the employee was at the time engaged in a personal recrea-
tional activity of his own off his employer's premises and 
"unrelated to the employment." 
[6] The commission's award here may be supported by 
taking the narrow view that a portion of the employer's 
premises injured the Richardsons-the falling walls and glass 
from the impact of the bulldozer (see Enterprise Dairy Co. 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 202 Cal. 247). It is also 
supported on the broader view expressed in the Kimbol case, 
supra, where the court said that the injury was ''. . . due 
wholly to the unauthorized use by another of the floor above 
for storage purposes, and the consequent subjection of that 
floor to a greater burden than that for which it was designed. 
But because of this unauthorized use of the floor above for 
storage purposes those below were in fact in danger of injury 
from a collapse of the floor, and in that sense the place in 
which Douglas was required to do all his work was an unsafe 
place. The danger was one peculiar to that very place-
an incident of the particular premises used as they were 
being used-and it is not unreasonable to say that Douglas 
was specially exposed to that danger by reason of his employ-
ment. Solely by reason of and in pursuance of such employ-
ment he was required to remain in this unsafe place exposed 
to this danger of a collapse of the ceiling of the room in which 
he was constantly at work. The risk was normally one inci-
dent to working in that place, one due solely to its unsafe 
condition." (Kim.bol v. Industrial Ace. Com., 173 Cal. 351, 
354 [160 P. 150, Ann.Cas. 1917E 312, L.R.A. 1917B 595].) 
'I'hns here the employer's premises became unsafe because 
of the uncontrolled bulldozer. [7] Where the injury occurs 
on the employer's premises, while the employee is in the 
course of the employment, the injury arises out of the em-
v. INDUSTRIAL Aco. 
[46 C.2d 90; 292 P.2d 892] 
l"'"·rr~<>nr unless the connection is so remote 
that it is not an incident of it. In 
95 
b?tdustrial Ace. Com., supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 804, 807, 
calling attention to the requirement for liberal construe-
of workmen's compensation laws, Mr. Justice 
: "One departures was in 'street risk' cases, 
Frigidaire Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 103 Cal. 
27 [283 P. 974], is an example .... 
there are the 'horseplay' or 'skylarking' cases. At 
in California recovery was not permitted an employee 
who was injured through horseplay or skylarking of his fel-
low employees .... But in Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. IndttStrial 
Com., 26 Cal.2d 286 [158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313], this 
was changed and the holding in Coronado Beach Co. v. 
P1.ti~sb1.JWU. supra [172 Cal. 682 (158 P. 212, L.R.A. 1916F 
and the other cases expressly overruled. . . . 
we have cases where the courts have held that be-
cause the thing that injured the employee was an instru-
mentality of the employer, the injury is compensable even 
the force which actually was responsible for the 
came from outside the employer's premises. 
first case on this subject was Kimbol v. Industrial 
Com., 173 Cal. 351 [160 P. 150, Ann.Cas. 1917 312, 
1917B 595] .•.. 
"In Pacific lndem, Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 86 Cal. 
~~""·-·~ 726 [195 P.2d 919], the employee was injured when 
an explosion in a plant across the street caused a window 
in the plant where the employee was working to strike the 
employee .... Again in Enterprise Dairy Co. v. Industrial 
Aoo. Oom., 202 Cal. 247 [259 P. 10991, where an employee 
was injured by the falling, due to an earthquake, of a two-
building adjoining his employer's garage, in which 
employee was then working, the court held the employer 
because the falling of such building through the garage 
milk bottles which the employee was handling, 
and hence 'he was injured by the broken glass and not by 
earthquake.' While this and similar cases labor somewhat 
to show that the actual substance which injured the employee 
was an instrumentality of the employer, a real analysis of 
the and rulings in these cases shows that actually the 
c.ourts were allowing compensation because his employment 
orl)U~tnt the employee into what became a position of danger 
though that danger was not, and in many instances could 
have been foreseen either by the employer or employee, 
MADIN v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. [46 C.2d 
to the particular 
location. 
''As far back a writer in 18 California Law Re-
said: 'When an employment places an 
place to do his work, indoors or out-
so placed is injured because at work 
in that should be awarded for the injury, 
in the field of disease where it is needed to distinguish 
industrial from non-industrial diseases.' The trend of the 
decisions in this state since that date has been to support 
that although, as pointed out, the courts have been 
reluctant to use that language .... 
''The latest trend is shown by statements such as the 
following: 'The theory upon which the workmen's compensa-
tion laws were enacted was that evidence should not be 
required to establish all the factors of the workman's environ-
ment, but that in order to receive an award he needs show 
merely that his work brought him within the range of danger 
by requiring his presence in the precincts of his employer's 
premises at the time the peril struck. . . . Compensable in-
juries need not be of the kind anticipated by the employer 
or peculiar to the employment. . . . It is sufficient that the 
injury results from a danger to which he was exposed as an 
employee.' (Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial .Ace. Com., 
supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 726, 728.) This case also cites with 
approval the following from Jlarvey v. Caclclo De Soto Cotton 
Oil Co., 199 La. 720 [6 So.2d 747, 750] : ' " ... that his 
death was due to the fact that his employment necessitated 
that he be at the place where the accident occurred and that, 
therefore . . . the accident arose out of, and was incident 
to the employment.''' (Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industn:az 
.Ace. Com., sttpra, p. 733.) Referring to a Louisiana case 
(which is not cited) the court said (p. 732): 'His death 
>Yas due to the fact that his work necessitated his presence 
there. Therefore, under a liberal interpretation of the com-
pensation act, the accident arose out of and was incidental 
to the employee's duties. The court there declared that the 
test, in cases where the accident originates from a force 
disconnected with the employment, is whether the employee 
is exposed to greater danger by reason of his assignments 
than that to which the public is subjected, whether the cause 
is an act of God or of a mundane inhabitant.' ' "It is 
sufficient that the work brings the claimant within the range 
of peril by requiring his presence there when it strikes.'' ' " 
Petitioners assert that Mrs. Richardson was earning less 
r 
r 
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75 per 
"based upon millimum " 
Section 4453 provided: ''In average annual 
for purposes of temporary disability indemnity only, 
tht~ average weekly earnings shall be taken at not less than 
($15) nor more than ... ($53.85). In computing 
av<'rage annual earnings for purposes of disability 
the average weekly earnings shall he taken at not 
le,.::; than ... ($15) nor more than ... ($46.16). Between 
thrse Umits the average wrckly earnings, except as provided 
in 4456 to 4459, shall be arrived at as follows: ... ''* 
By 1hat section the Legislature has in effect said that the 
capacity of any person covered the >vorkmen 's 
compensation laws shall not be computed at less than $15 
per week vVe find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in 
snch a provision. The Legislature could reasonably conclude 
that the great bulk of workers would have earnings of at 
lem;t that sum. In New Ym·k Cent. R. Co. v. Blanc, 250 
U 596, 602 [ 40 S.Ct. 44, G3 I-1.Ed. 11611, the court was 
concerned with the contention that a provision for compen-
sation for disfigurement where there was no showing of 
to work was a denial of due process. The court 
held that it was reasonable to assume that disfigurement 
wm!ld interfere with the ability to find g·ainful employment 
and also that: '' ... impairment of eaming power is [not J 
the sole ground upon which eompn1sol'y compensation to 
IYOrkmen lt'gitimately may be basec1. ... In view 
and there being no specific finding of :melJ impairment 
cases, it is proper to say that in onr opinion the 
'due process of law' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
doe;, not require the States to base compulsory compensation 
upon loss of rcarning power. 
----------------~---~------
was amended in 1955 to change the 
on temporary disability and to $23.08 
ability. (Stats. 1955, ch. 956.) 
46 C.2d-4 
to $:33.08 nnd $61.54 
on permanent dis~ 
MADIK v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. Co:M. [46 C.2d 
stated in the Arizona case, 
250 U.S. 400 
6 A.hR. 1537)]: 
of action for 
workmen upon grounds not un-
just, the question whether the award measured as 
compensatory damages are measured at common law, or 
according to some prescribed seale reasonably adapted to 
produce a fair is for the State itself to determine.' 
And we see no constitutional reason why a State may not, 
in ascertaining the amount of such compensation in particular 
cases, take into consideration any substantial physical im-
pairment attributable to the injury, whether it immediately 
affects earning capacity or not." In Rich Hill Coal Co. v. 
Chesrmt, 355 Pa. 13 [ 47 A.2d 801, 806], the court said: 
''Section 306 of the Act of 1937 provides that the compensa-
tion for injuries resulting in total disability and for all 
disability resulting from certain permanent injuries there 
specified shonld be not less than $12 per \Ye<'k. Plaintiffs 
urge that this minimum might resnlt in the compensation 
being greater in some cases than the amount of wages pre-
viously earned by the employee. The testimony indicated 
that the prescribed minimum exceeded wages only to an 
extremely trifling extent and for very limited periods. A 
wage of $12 per week is probably less than is earned by all 
but a negligible few-no such cases were shown to exist in 
the anthracite industry-so that this complaint is essentially 
de minimis. Moreover it has been held that such payments do 
not violate the clue process clause of the 14th Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution. New York Central. R. Co. v. 
Bianc, 250 U.S. 596, 602 [ 40 S.Ut. 44, 63 hEel. 1161], affirm-
ing the decision of Judge Cardozo in 8wreling v. Amen·.can 
Knife Co., 226 N.Y. 199, 200 [123 N.E. 83]." West v. 
Industrial Ace. Corn., 79 Cal.App.2d 711 [180 P.2d 972], 
did not involve any question of eonstitutionalit~'· 
The awards are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and ~reComb, J., concurred. 
